ftlm

Illusions!

Some visual illusions and generative art. Using Clojurescript and quill.

Perception is dreamed up, but it is a dream about the world. Isn't it beautiful?

Inspired by Dr. Christof Koch's 'The Green Chaser': 1

Lecture 9: Seeing the World in Color

It's a cool visual illusion. I thought I go and play with that myself.

Warning: Some links in this blog post lead to fullscreen - intensely flashing lights.

Code. This is what you end up with when you just go bottom up and you stop when it works. Interesting, to grow my Lisp library to make these toy game worlds. Simply putting a new a piece in when I need it, and letting the code grow by itself.

> Note: Some scenes don't work so well on mobile

Versions:

#0 The Green Chaser

You hold your gaze in the center black dot. After a little while, you will find a striking transformation of the scenery presented to you.

— (I recommend trying it out, spoilers below)

#1 Chaser Variation

When I look at this, I see multiple green dots, and lines of green dots that make triangles and later a square. After flickering incomprehensible for a few moments, new green forms 'pop out' again. There is a moment when 3 green balls are rotating clockwise, and then I perceive counterclockwise motion, with an offset.

Then lines on an octagon, hexagon, then square, then triangle, made up of segments of green balls. These chains of segments feel like they are in a straight line.

At times, I would perceive pink balls going counterclockwise. If I look long enough, the scene can transform into 3 curved segments of green stripes, going counterclockwise then clockwise. Without any pink left in my awareness.

The 'slower' chaser movement produces a green square, which wipes away the pink balls, leaving behind space for the green segments to fill.

An alternative name for this is 'The Green Wiper' because the way the green is wiping away the pink is a bit like the second level of the illusion for me.

#2 Chaser more

More green segments go around the circlers, then morph into a dance of concentric, segmented green-pink disco lights. Their form is reminiscent of a nuclear hazard icon, concentric circles with trapezoid segments at times.

Then, I might perceive the whole thing turning clockwise slowly, adding a whole layered perception to this.

#3 I Don't Need Drugs

I'm the artist now. It's up to me to decide what is over the top and what is not.

This is the same as #2 but scaled with more circles.

There is a lot of stuff going on when you look at this and give it a chance to produce its magic in your perception.

There is so much blinking green stuff going in circles… Also, I start perceiving motion clockwise and counterclockwise again at times.

To me, it seems like the green is filling in the spaces between pink at some point. And there is roughly as much green as there is pink.

Sometimes it looks like green segments are traveling inward concentrically while moving clockwise or counterclockwise subtly.

I get somewhat nauseated when looking at this, not kidding.

I'm loose with the concept of 'too much'.

#4 Chaser Spider

My idea was to add more 'hints' that point to these imaginary balls.

#5 Simple Circuit

I moved on to another aspect of these illusions: Can I make one that persists, even when you move your eyes?

The obvious first thing to try is a repeating pattern over the whole visual field.

Something else happens to me when I watch this, I feel like I start moving my eyes in the rhythm of the scene.

Not sure, does it work? I think I can dismiss the green balls wherever I look, but it is progress that I always perceive green in the periphery.

#6 Not Alive Yet

What is happening… me and the scene starts having a relationship that evolves. My mind starts putting little stories into the movement of the elements in the scene. It makes me wonder about gen art that would be something like 'visual music'.

First I feel the cyan balls prevent the green balls from appearing, later the cyan balls and the periphery all mesh in a dance.

I might follow a cyan ball and get the feeling it has a relationship to the surrounding circuit. I might feel that a cyan one is dancing on and off with a pink one or a group of pink ones. Or I feel that a cyan ball is my little friend, finding its way into this pink computer circuit.

Then I look at the whole thing at once again and I feel it going in rhythm, I feel the rhythm in my mind, too. The cyan balls might feel like they come from my vision and not the scene, just for a moment. Like the little fireflies, you see when you look at a bright window. I see ghostly green balls moving in clockwork-like motions around the background.

The pink circles are like a computer circuit, precise and vaguely nonliving. The cyan balls look slightly more like something from nature. Maybe it's the interplay between those 2 concepts that make this my favorite piece of this series.

Those cyan balls have a soul of a kind. A small and digital soul. Not alive yet.

#7 Patterns Are Your Fault

They all go white every few seconds.

#8 Nr 8

I watched #7 and I felt like it would be satisfying to see the cyan ones by themselves. For some reason, I had the idea this would be like a reward to me.

It's a little bit like some of the magic of #7 is revealed. Depends on how much you interpreted into the balls I suppose.

I wonder a little bit about these visual artifacts you get from simply looking at a window, the sky or maybe a white wall.

The movement of these cyan balls is a bit like these artifacts. It's government by (gaussian) normal distributions. Makes sense that whatever happens in the brain that is making the fireflies has normal distributions somewhere, too.

My pet hypothesis about these is that the movement detectors go slightly above a threshold from all the bright inputs. And it's normally distributed how far and in what directions you then start predicting some little lights.

#9 Messing With You

Another variation of #7.

The experience is quite enhanced by listening to some music at the same time.

Blink and surprise?

The other striking aspect of this (chaser #0,1,..) illusion is that, while the impression of seeing green balls is strong, it is equally striking how easy it is to re-orient away from the illusion.

Moving the eyes a little or doing some blinks will wipe it away instantly.

I have decided that I consider this aspect of such an illusion just as interesting as the ghostly visual stuff.2

It seems like there are 2 aspects of how perception works.

There is an evolving situation, an evolving cognition, some ever more dreamed-up cognition and interpretation of the "raw input". And then there is a re-orienting, a re-calibrating back towards the real world again.

These 2 aspects of perception are seemingly in conflict. One is that perception is fabricated, confabulated, and dreamed up by the mind. Perception is a meaning-level construct. The blind spot is filled in, magic tricks work, and we see green balls where there are none. The other aspect is that perception is totally about the world, otherwise it would be useless.

It looks a little like there are 2 kinds of sources of interpretation in the system, in general. One is from the sensors, 'realistic' and one is from the imagination 'derived'.

  [ A, B, C, ... ]  input stream (sensors)

                     ^
                     |
                     |
                     |
                     |             R
             +--------------------+
             |                    |
     +-------+ [ A, B, C, ...]    | realistic brain (1:1 input stream encoding or something)
     |       +--------------------+ less derived states
     |           +    +                                                    ^   |
     |           |    |                                                    |   | alternative view:
     |           +    |                                                        | I, the realistic brain,
     |                +  .. and then some stuff                            |   | use those higher predictions as
     |           +                                                         |   | resource to make my computations
     |           +    +                                                    |   |
     |                |                                                        |
     |                +                                                    |   |
     v           ^                                                         |   v
                 |                  P                                      |
surprise?   +----+-----------------+                                       |
signal      | [ A, B, C, D, E  ]   | prediction brain?  -------------------+ (mabye)
 |          |                      | derived states            I bully some lower parts into perceiving D and E.
 |          +----------------------+ cognitive states          Hence, green balls.
 |                                   imagination states
 |
 |
 +-- I tell the prediction guy:
     "Reset your stuff, begin again".


(This is half of Braitenberg Vehicle 13 - minus the comparator and the short-term memory).

Putting a prediction unit into your perception model is a common move. I think it is the first obvious answer to multiple kinds of questions. One of them is this: If you have some neuronal tissue, how can it start doing useful stuff by itself? Predicting my inputs comes immediately to mind; This is a useful mechanism, no matter the context, or lack thereof.

I will talk in other places about the idea that if the predictor is allowed to modify its inputs, too. Then we get into the world of confabulation, which is one of the key concepts, I think, of cognition.3

What happens when I blink or move my eyes? Something happens there that comes across like a mechanism that puts more emphasis on the real world again. Kinda fits with the 'wake up' hypothesis of thalamus circuits.4

My current thinking is that the perception cortex is loading itself up with a situation5 and the cognition states evolve for a little bit.

Then, the system is reset by a wake-up signal or surprise signal, maybe every time the inputs change dramatically (for instance). Maybe this has evolved to work well together with eye movements so that you get a low-level surprise signal now and then into the perception cortex, resetting the activity back to realistic states.

I am bound to be wrong about some stuff, but what if… the perception cortex evolves an interpretation of the world, as it sits with the inputs (in contemplative loops?), this top-down interpretation then bullies (or biases, or constrains) the lower perception cortical regions into perceiving based on those predictions, too (green balls).

Then some signal(s), maybe a surprise 'wake up' signal, tells the perception cortex to reset again, throw away some derived cognitive states and make the system more about the input signals again.

Perhaps there is a low-level surprise in this sense every time we move our eyes or blink.

Of course, there is no 'world'. There is 'only' the sensor inputs. The 'world' is a useful abstract label that the system uses to mark what is coming from the sensors. The system perceives these as 'real' - very useful.

The world in this model is something I call a point source of meaning. It is a label the system uses, it is saying 'This input comes from the world'. The fundamental issue of hallucination is that something is labeled 'world' when it should not have been.

This, I believe, is why a meditator can look for the world and see, that there are only perceptions and thoughts about the world, but never a world!

The wrong move to make is to proclaim that the world is 'merely an illusion' and does not exist after all.

When Darwin explained what life is, he did not say "And this is why life is an illusion and doesn't exist."

oh, it is merely a complicated process!. And then you suddenly get those first-year university students arguing about whether life exists.

No. He was a naturalist. And you are only a naturalist when you see the beauty in nature just as it is. You let it be, too.

He said, "There is grandeur in this view of life…".

And so too it with the mind. It is not that we explain the mind and then there is less there. It is that we make the world bigger by adding an explanation of the mind to it. How grand is this world, where the mind is part of it?

There is grandeur in this view of mind, where what we perceive is [ something, something ] generated by our cognitive machine…

The world of our mind is very much real, just as temperature is real even though it is kinetic motion energy of particles.

I had the perception input states initially as blue on the whiteboard, so the world is blue. I had the actuators drawn in red, so now I think of actuator cognition as red cognition. There is a use for a red point meaning, too: 'The Self'. (Vehicle 17, future).

Another thing that is striking about these kinds of illusions:

The perception of the green balls is sort of ghostly as if the system is signaling to itself 'and here is some tentative idea of green balls'. As if the system is used to have false dreams about its visual perception or something.

It fits with those visual artifacts I get now and then and doesn't bother me too much. Sometimes there is some flicker going across a small span of the visual field or something. Or I look directly at a light and get an afterimage, forming this or that blob or bar or whatever. And they are very ghostly, too. As if the system is attuned to the concept of artifacts coming from the machinery itself, and it already has a label for that, too. "Ghostly visual stuff".

So maybe the system knows that the green balls come from the derived cognition cortex, and not from the input cortex. (For instance).

Now one might wonder, this marking, or this knowledge of where things come from - whatever mechanism is responsible for this?

Another striking thing in this space of perception/cognition:

Consider imagining something in the visual scene. It feels like some kind of transparent overlay on top of the visual scene, it somehow is there and yet, it is very much not there, too.

It seems like the system is very careful to keep the concept clear: 'This is not real perception'.

You cannot trick it into just starting to perceive something. In order to trick it you need to make illusions like the Green Chaser, or be a trained magician who can fool the system of a user into perceiving this or that.

This again gives me the idea that however this thing works it has a strong notion of 'world' and 'stuff that comes from the world' (or sensors). And conversely, maybe it has a strong notion of 'this is stuff from the inner world', too. It is almost like there is a signal that specifically says 'This is not the world'.

I'll throw out a little conjecturing: maybe in the brain this is implemented by the identity of the thalamic nuclei that a signal comes from.

So in general this is my view:

                                                  cortex
       +--------+--------------------------------------------------------------+--------+
       |        |                                                              |        |
       |        |                                                              |        |
       |        |                                    ^                         |        |
       |        +------------------------------------+-------------------------+        |
       |        |                                    |                         |        |
       |        |                                    | 'internal inputs'       |        |
       |        |   cortex->lgn                      |                         |        |
       |       -+----------------+                   |                         |        |
       |        |  attention etc.|                   |                         |        |
       |        |                |       thalamus    |                         |        |
       |        |                |                   |                         |        |
       |        |             +--v-----------+-------+------+                  |        |
       |        |             |              |       |      |                  |        |
       |     ---+-----+-------+-->           |       |   <--+-------+----------+----    |
       +--------+     |       |              |              |       |          +--------+
                      |       |              |              |       |
                      |       |              |              |       |
                      |       |              |              |       +------------ 'not world', 'my inner world'
           -----------+       +-----+--------+---------+----+
label: 'world'                      |                  |
                                    |                  |
                                                       |
                       'lower thalamic nuclei'         'higher thalamic nuclei'
                       'lgn, mgn, ...'                 'pulvinar?, ...'
                       sensor inputs                   'cognition inputs'
                       realistic states                derived states, prediction states
                       surprise signals(?)             evolved signals



I am just conjecturing around a little, I am bound to be wrong.

Now everybody in the cortex can look at the Thalamus and see 2 kinds of things. World things and internal things.

If you mix up the thalamic nuclei you get something like hallucinations - or if you have too much meaning going back from the cortex into the input side of the thalamus.

The green balls of the Green Chaser then would be something that happens in the realistic / input part of the system. That is what the illusion is, a low-level kind of hallucination. Where the system says 'out there in the world are green balls'.

Maybe the reason you don't see the green balls immediately is that the system has to sit with the inputs for a while, the more derived cortex makes some hypotheses about green balls and bullies the realistic brain into perceiving them.

Maybe you can measure how long it takes to see the green balls and it tells you something about the nature of such a circuit. Maybe usually you would have moved your eyes by that time at the latest, and the system is biased towards 'after that much time of analyzing a scene I would usually parse the actual objects of the scene'. But we sort of hacked the system by not moving our eyes, so there was no reset-to-realistic event in the system and the situation kept evolving - sitting with our cognition states.

You could break the surprise signal in some way, and your perceptions continue to evolve, instead of resetting back to realistic states. We can make a hyperparameter in the system, too. That says how much the cognition states are allowed to influence the realistic states.

Maybe surprise and noradrenaline can quickly bias this back to the realistic states?

Maybe serotonin modulates how long you spend with your cognition until you reset?

Perhaps LSD breaks the biochemistry of the surprise signal?

Maybe on LSD, a person cannot wipe the green balls away (so well) by blinking or moving the eyes?

Maybe on LSD, perception keeps evolving, instead of resetting? Thereby making the brain more about its imagination, and less about the real world.

The other place where this system can break is when there is too much meaning flowing down in the cortex->lgn arrow of this thing.

Internal inputs are inputs of a kind, so there is a second world of a kind, too: Stuff from my dreams / my cognition / my imagination.

In my current evolving view of cognition, this is one of the key aspects: The system is allowed to communicate with itself via perception (input…) states. This is an elegant design because now I can use some of the same machinery to represent different 'cognitive contents'. For instance episodic memories or imagination states. Or a face is allowed to serve as a label for a person, a small situation as a label for a relationship and so forth.

Confabulation / Filling in the blanks / Vague ideas

This kind of illusion is augmented three-fold by listening to some music at the same time.

This reminds me of another aspect: When I look at such visuals (without music), I sort of perceive ('hear' but don't hear) a little bit of ghostly auditory, rhythmic 'imaginary hearing' perceptions.

It comes again across like some kind of tentative interpretation 'and here you might expect these kinds of sounds'. Btw I am not alive gives tiny sounds, like little digital blibs, for the cyan balls and sort of more global swooosh, swoosh sounds for the background. The swooshes come in overlapping waves sort of, as if they build up for a moment. Like 'dalubdub-dalubdub-dalu [small pause]'. Kinda feels like a raw, overlapping rhythm or something.

My view of perception and cognition is that these are top-down prediction states, using the auditory system to perceive XYZ. Maybe the system wants to go in harmony with itself6, so if I see something going in rhythm, I expect to also hear something going in rhythm.

This makes a great cognition-building material. Now we can think in terms of vague states, which the rest of the system is allowed to fill in. Consider episodic memory, if I can have a vague idea of a few perception states of a memory, the rest of the system can go in harmony with those states, filling in coherent 'perception' states.

So I see confabulation and vague ideas as 2 sides of the same coin, and a key aspect of what cognition is. Vehicle 15, when I program it, is a confabulation mechanism. 7

I am a huge fan of vague ideas for many reasons. I believe it is the power of abstraction and programming there, to disregard the details.

Current audio diary musings on models of cognition

That's basically if you are some kind of real fan of my work. Get real intimate with my raw thoughts, this is from my audio diary:

https://recorder.google.com/b53ae19f-2793-486e-b227-f78cf2c267e3

Footnotes:

1

I went through this Coding & Vision 101 Series from Allen Institute with Dr. Christof Koch. Quite a cool lecture, with a lot of references to Hubel / Wiesel kind of stuff. Focus on vision but addresses wide neuroscience thinking, too.

More thoughts here.

2

Similarly, it is just as interesting that perception is about the real world, as it is interesting that imagination exists. I think there might be a bias sometimes in this area towards imagination being so much more interesting.

3

I think Daniel Dennett would agree - see the multiple drafts model.

4

The Thalamus: typical biology-guy move to mix up different levels of analysis like it is nothing.

"Yeah and here is this molecular biology finding and then we make a hypothesis on the circuit again based on that…". It does draw a bigger picture though.

5

How does a cortex load itself up with a situation one might wonder.

Everything looks like the answer is neuronal activity.

Consider spiking neurons going back and forth, this already is a memory unit. You activate one of them and now you have a loaded-up neuronal unit. With activity happening.

start signal
  |
  v

[ A ] ----------> [ A' ]
  ^                 |
  +-----------------+

Neurons A and A prime will forever activate each other! This is already not utterly useless. It's a memory unit that says whether the 'start signal' ever happened.

Now consider that you can use 100 x 1000 neurons to encode a substantial bit of information. That is something like a cubic millimeter of cortex. That roughly fits 20-50 times into a drop of water.

This cortex can go back and forth with its activation a little (short-term memory).

I am imagining a substance that can be loaded up with meaning. Imagine you have a magic stone that you can put in the sun and now it is a little bit about the sun.

(More in future computer program explorations of such cell assembly level considerations).

If you make a bit of a baseline activity + some inhibitory neurons, you now have signal detectors for the absence of something.

More on this elsewhere. But a great little intro to such circuit thinking is Braitenberg Vehicles book.

6

Meaning that the prediction states align.

If everything is allowed to go the other way, too. Then you get this confabulation nature.

If a predictor is allowed to modify and re-arrange its short-term memory inputs, then it can decide to modify its inputs to get a harmonious prediction story snippet. (More to come: Vehicle 15, 16)

7

The main idea is that with vehicle 15, the predictor is allowed to modify the short-term memories, too (see Braitenberg vehicle 13).

Date: 2024-02-12 Mon 18:38

Email: Benjamin.Schwerdtner@gmail.com

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